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Abstract:
In response to the centrally controlled Bantu Education system, the resistance movement
advocated a decentralized system of educational governance that included local voices in the running
of schools. In 1996, the government satisfied the movement’s demands by including local school
governing bodies (SGBs) as apart of the South African Schools Act (SASA). Attached to the powers of
SGBs however was a right not advocated by the movement: the ability to set school fees. SGBs’
authority over school fee policy has transformed their role in school governance from democratic
platforms for local voices into efficient cost and budgeting centers. As a result of school fee
implementation, South Africa witnessed the creation of an education market in which student access is
determined by an economic “ability to pay” standard. This essay challenges the introduction of
market based reforms by expanding upon Elizabeth Anderson’s “The Ethical Limitations of the
Market.” Through a case study of a former Model C school in South Durban, I argue that the norms
guiding market decisions within SGBs undermine the way parents and learners value education. If the
goal of education is to teach students democratic values and the ideals of responsible citizenship, the
market, an inherently egoistic and impersonal mechanism for distributing educational goods, is illsuited for the task. Suggestions for further research are noted.
I. Introduction

The goal of my ISP is to determine whether the marketing responsibilities devolved to SGBs promote
economic norms which undermine important social values in education. While the literature identifies the
failures of marketisation as a tool for redress, my research extends this substantive critique by assessing school
fee policy from an ethical standpoint. I am concerned with the competitive and egoistic values that govern
market relations and whether these norms undermine the larger social aim of education in preparing learners to
become responsible citizens. In this sense, my research is less focused on the aspects of racial integration and
more concerned with the effect market values have on learners across the racial and economic spectrum.
My argument is premised on Anderson’s (1995) critique of market norms and her notion of sphere
differentiation as a means to secure important democratic values. 1 The introduction of school fees and its
establishment of local markets for education conflict with Anderson’s argument for establishing barriers
between market and nonmarket systems. Through a case study of Durban Academy, I look to determine if
market norms guide decisions within the SGB, and if these norms corrupt teacher, parent, and student valuations
of education. Assessing South African school policy through Anderson’s lens identifies the moral concerns over
market systems in the public education sector. The potential benefits of my research rest in its ability to better
conceptualize the way school fee policy impacts the lives of parents and learners.
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My research is comprised of five sections. Section 1 provides a historical overview of the People’s
Education movement and the creation of SGBs. Included in the first section is a discussion on the reasons
school fees were introduced and the positive and negative aspects that have developed from the creation of local
education markets. Section 2 outlines Anderson’s ethical concerns over unregulated market practices and
relates the potential issues arising from market-based distributions of education. Section 3 describes the specific
aims of my ISP, the reasons for selecting Durban Academy, and the particular methods employed. Section 4
presents the findings of my research, in which I assess the presence or absence of market norms in three
communities at Durban Academy: the SGB, teachers, and parents/students. Conclusions and suggestions for
further research are discussed in the final section. Based on the data gained at Durban Academy, I conclude that
the market is inherently flawed as a mechanism in the distribution of educational goods. The financial burden
placed on SGBs forces these institutions to operate along market norms, which in turn, undermines parents’ and
students’ freedom to value education as a shared good and realize the democratic values that the schooling
system is designed to promote.

II. Historical Context
This section traces the historical forces that led to the development of South Africa’s decentralized
system of educational governance. Specific emphasis is placed on the role of SGBs in providing local platforms
for community involvement. An analysis of the reasons why school fees were introduced is then examined.
This section closes with an assessment of SGBs and school fee policy.

‘People’s Education for People’s Power’
When the Nationalist Party passed the Bantu Education Act in 1953, the majority became increasingly
fearful of a centrally controlled education system. The “gutter education” administered by the apartheid regime
was, as Gilomee (2004) observes, “designed to prepare blacks for a marginal place in life.” 2 The lack of
resources, medium of instruction, and poor quality of teaching worked to reproduce the apartheid notion of a
subservient black population. In response to the oppressive Bantu Education system, the democratic movement
mobilized under the grassroots organization—People’s Education for People’s Power. 3
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According to Soobrayan (1990), though the People’s Education movement prioritized efforts to end
Bantu Education, they began outlining a general framework for a post-apartheid education system during the
struggle. 4 The movement sought to replace the strong central apartheid authority with local structures for
community involvement. They reasoned that the only way to ensure that local voices would be heard was to
decentralize the educational policymaking process. Soobrayan describes the rationale behind the People’s
Education movement’s emphasis on local control:
Under Nationalist control education is used to further subservience and oppression. Whereas in the
hands of the people it becomes a weapon for liberation. Therefore, for education to serve the interests
of the majority, the majority must not only control it, but the people must also participate in its
conception, formulation and implementation. 5
Soobrayan’s assessment identifies the ways in which the guiding principles of People’s Education were a
response to the abhorred centrally controlled apartheid system. Supporting Soobrayan’s observation, Fiske and
Ladd (2004) argue that the majority viewed schools as “instruments of the apartheid government,” and that the
only way they could overcome their deep-rooted distrust over apartheid institutions was to devolve the decisionmaking processes to the local level. 6 Similarly, Dieltiens et al. (2007) describe the movement’s commitment to
local control as an attempt to “undermine structural hierarchies.” 7
Perhaps the clearest indication of the movement’s values is expressed through the words of the leaders
themselves. In 1996, Walter Sisulu voiced the demands of the People’s Education by stating, “We are not
prepared to accept any ‘alternative’ to Bantu education that is imposed from above.” 8 Sisulu’s comment
identifies the merging of liberation ideology and a growing emphasis on local control. According to Sisulu,
education policy would be decided from the ground up through local involvement. But the notion of People’s
Education was not only an appealing euphemism, it was a principle embedded in the Freedom Charter’s
message that, “The people shall govern.” 9 The movement’s rejection of Bantu Education spurred the demand
for a decentralized system of education. But while the People’s Education movement was busy protesting Bantu
Education and constructing plans for a post-apartheid education system, the NP was busy constructing its own
plans to forestall educational redress.
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The NP Perspective—Unilateral Restructuring and the Model C Plan
Unlike the democratic movement, the state was in an advantageous position by virtue of its presiding
control over the education system. Pampallis (1993) uses the term, “unilateral restructuring,” to describe the
NP’s last-minute attempts to entrench white privilege. 10 As in the case of the People’s Education movement,
the NP advocated for a more decentralized system of educational decision-making, but for radically different
reasons. The NP’s conversion of public schools to Model C schools marked the first of its efforts to decentralize
education policy and empower local white communities.
Beginning in 1991, white public schools were allowed to select from three different models from which
to begin integrating black students. Initially, three models were proposed: Model A converted former state
schools to private institutions, Model B allowed state schools to remain public institutions, and Model C
converted state schools into semi-private state aided schools. On April 1, 1992, the Department of Education
and Culture in the House of Assembly announced that all white state schools would become Model C schools.
While the government granted white state schools the alternative to remain Model B through a two-thirds
majority vote from the parents, schools selecting Model B faced severe funding cutbacks. Moreover, these
schools were not allowed to charge school fees to supplement government funds. As a result of the NP’s
unilateral restructuring, 96% of white state schools became Model C by the end of 1992. 11
Dolby’s (2001) case study of Fernwood High identifies the factors that inclined parents to support the
Model C option. According to Dolby, the appeal of Model C rested in the considerable autonomy and control
parents had over the integration process. 12 Dolby describes the rational behind Fernwood’s decision to become
a Model C school by incorporating the voice of Fernwood’s SGB chair: “If we go Model C we’ve got control
and we just up the school fees and we will only take the nice blacks.” 13 Under Model C, parents were wellpositioned in a powerful financial gate-keeping role, which allowed them to prevent a mass learner migration to
their children’s schools through the adjustment of school fees. In the negotiations over post-apartheid
education, white constituents would remain committed to SGBs’ power to set school fees. The NP’s unilateral
restructuring began the decentralization process and marked the first instance of government incorporation of
market based approaches to funding public schools.

8
CODESA and the ‘Selling’ of School Fees to the Democratic Movement
Once it became clear that apartheid was no longer sustainable, the NP began assembling policy
alternatives to build upon the newly established Model C framework. Describing the NP’s response toward the
end of apartheid, Pampallis notes, “The National Party has been busy putting together new policies which it
hopes it will be able to sell to the liberation movement, but which will effectively result in the maintenance of
white privilege.” One such policy alternative was the creation of SGBs and the provision of financial
responsibilities to these local organizations.
But even the negotiation process was a strategic opportunity for the NP to shift the majority’s support in
favor of their policy recommendations. Nzimande (1993) argues that the NP used the CODESA (Convention
for a Democratic South Africa) negotiation process to divide the ANC from the democratic movement. Having
struggled for decades against closed-door negotiations, advocates of People’s Education argued for talks to take
place “on the ground” as opposed to “around the table.” 14 Describing the concerns of the People’s Education
movement, Nizmande writes,
The constitutional negotiations at the moment are largely about creating formal structures of
representative democracy. Important as this may be, there is a grave danger that the debate around the
struggles to build and institutionalize participatory democracy may be lost. It is within this framework,
for instance, that the issue of the role and location of PTSAs/PTAs should be approached. 15
The CODESA agreements managed to link black fears to white aspirations by strengthening the movement’s
support for local governing bodies. While the ANC understood the potential setbacks of local control over
education, the majority became increasingly committed to a decentralized system of educational governance.
Pampallis (1998) compares the ironic merging of interests between the NP and the mass movement as, “a
coincidence of the interests of the two most powerful, if usually antagonistic, constituencies.” 16 With the social
and political climate treading in its favor, the NP began its attempt to sell its version of post-apartheid education.
Based on the historic role of Parent Teacher Student Associations (PTSAs), selling the idea of school
governing bodies was not difficult. During the resistance struggle, the National Education Crisis Committee
(NECC) established PTSAs in order to coordinate parent and student protests. 17 PTSAs gained widespread
support and were lauded for their ability to wrest control from the state. 18 Sithole (1994) argues that the masses’
support for PTSAs stems from a widespread “fear of victimization.” 19 Unlike the distant, centrally controlled

9
Bantu Education system, PTSAs were local, transparent organizations that looked to include the people’s voices
rather than exclude them. Embodying the mass movement’s support for PTSAs, Nzimande states, “The only
way to guarantee a thoroughgoing transformation is to develop organs of people’s power now.” 20 Selling the
idea of SGBs thus blended well with the democratic movement’s support for PTSAs.
While the merging of the black PTSAs and white SGBs of the Model C system satisfied both the ANC
and the NP, debate concerning the particular roles and responsibilities of the SGBs were much more difficult to
resolve. Conflict between the ANC and NP centered on the issue of school fees. In order to convince the ANC
and the democratic movement that SGBs should be granted the power to set school fees, the NP relied on three
arguments: 1) there was a need for supplementary funds to accommodate the massive influx of black learners, 2)
allowing white schools to set school fees would “free up public funds” and allow the government to focus its
resources on those schools with the greatest need, 3) and school fees would prevent another bifurcated education
system by retaining policy makers’ support within the public school domain. 21 In the first instance, the Hunter
Committee estimated that the education budget would double from R25.6 billion to R62.4 billion if school fees
were not introduced. 22 In addition, supplementary funds from the private sector would allow the government to
channel its resources to the rural and township schools. Concerning the flight of influential policymakers and
professionals from public schools, the second White Paper on education argues that failing to allow SGBs to set
school fees would make it impossible for the government to maintain the quality of former white schools. This
in turn would cause professionals to move their children into private institutions, resulting in a bifurcated
educational system resembling that of the apartheid past. Though the ANC acknowledged the arguments
presented by the NP, the movement’s lifelong commitment to ‘free education for all’ made accepting school
fees a difficult task. 23 Moreover, the ANC recognized how SGB control over school fees would inhibit
integration efforts by creating a loophole in the non-racial admissions policy. Negotiations over school fees
would continue until 1996.

The South African Schools Act—Successes and Failures of School Fee Implementation
Although initially opposed to school fees, the democratic movement eventually conceded to the NP’s
demands. In 1996 the government passed the South African Schools Act, which remains the most fundamental
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piece of legislation on post-apartheid education. 24 Included in the Act is the stipulation for SGB membership
and their particular roles and responsibilities in school governance. Under SASA, SGBs must include a parent
majority with representation from the principal, teachers, staff, and learners. In addition to membership
stipulations, SASA outlines the responsibilities of SGBs, which include: adopting a constitution and mission
statement, determining admission policy, overseeing school property, recommending the appointment of
teaching staff to the Department of Education, and developing a budget for the school, which may include
school fees. 25
Pampallis’s “School Fees” provides a general overview of the general successes and failures of SASA.
Perhaps the greatest success resulting from the Act was the integration of black urban learners into former white
schools. Describing the new multiracial Model C schools, Pampallis remarks, “They have absorbed children of
the emerging black middle class (African, coloured and Indian), as well as a limited number of poorer black
families.” 26 Supporting Pampallis’s observation, Karlsson’s case study of former Model C schools in Durban
identifies a similar increase in the enrollment of middle class applicants irrespective of the learners’ race. 27
Another success of SASA has been its ability to retain the support of the professional class. Since SASA allows
SGBs to set school fees, former white schools have continued to offer quality education, which has prevented
the flight of professionals from the public school system. Thus, independent schools account for less than 5% of
all South African learners. 28
But while former Model C schools have continued to thrive under SASA, the vast majority of black
township and rural schools have remained severely impoverished. Consistent with Pampallis and Karlsson’s
observations, Tikly and Mabogoane (1997) observe that the provision of school fees has benefitted only a small
minority of urban middle class black learners, while ignoring the majority of disadvantaged learners in the
townships and rural communities. The authors observe that the effectiveness of SGBs is dependent on the
wealth and social capital of the surrounding community. As a result, SGBs in poorer areas have lacked the
capacity of SGBs in more affluent areas, deepening the divide between former white and former black public
schools. 29
Recent amendments to SASA like the Norms and Standards for School Funding (NSSF) have looked to
address SGB inefficiencies in poorer communities. Under the NSSF, the poorest 20% of schools receive the
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highest level of government support. 30 Despite the government’s renewed focus on poorer schools, the overall
quality in these schools has not improved. 31 As a result of minimal government support, 98% of schools in poor
township and rural areas charge school fees despite their inability to collect these payments. 32 Since the
introduction of school fees has placed the onus of funding schools on SGBs, local community members are
forced to demand payment from parents in order to maintain school operations. 33 A recent study by the Nelson
Mandela Foundation observes SGB members have resorted to physical violence and humiliation tactics to
acquire school fee payments. 34 In addition, Pampallis argues that since attaining funds from the central
government is often a difficult and lengthy process, SGBs turn to local parents to address their financial needs.
While targeting these “softer targets” is a faster and more reliable method, it has fragmented parent participation
and local community involvement. 35
Complicating the financial challenges of poorer families is the fact that SASA does not legally bind
SGBs to inform parents of their exemption status. Since it is in the best interest of the school to collect a high
percentage of fees from the community, SGBs have avoided disclosing information concerning qualification for
exemption status. As a result, even in areas of absolute poverty, fee exemptions are not often used. 36 In
addition to withholding information from parents, SGBs have used screening tests and application fees to
exclude learners who may be unable to meet the cost of fees at a particular school. 37 Moreover, the exemption
requirements enumerated in SASA rarely apply to the vast majority of poorer families. Under SASA, a
families’ annual income must be less than ten times the cost of school fees in order for the family to gain at least
partial exemption. Based on the high threshold under SASA, exemption applies primarily to poor families who
send their children to wealthier schools, not the vast majority of poor families sending their children to poor
schools. For instance, school fees in poorer areas average R100. Parents would only be exempt from paying
fees if their annual income was less than R1,000 / year, but any family receiving social grants is already above
this income bracket. 38 Even if parents understood the requirements for exemption, very few parents, including
those living in extreme poverty, would qualify for school fee exemption.
In order to address the inefficiencies of school fee policy, the government amended the NSSF in 2006
and gave the Minister of Education the power to declare schools as no-fee schools. 39 Schools in national
quintiles one and two, which account for the poorest 40% of schools, were declared no-fee schools. As a result
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however, there has been an increased learner migration toward these no-fee schools, leaving quintile three
schools struggling to recruit learners and to accrue sufficient funds to maintain their schools. Chaka projects
that no-fee-schools policy will be extended to Quintile 3 schools by 2009. 40

Returning to the Ideals of People’s Education
Although the People’s Education movement has seen their dreams of “local organs for peoples power”
become a reality, the NP’s unilateral restructuring and attachment of school fees to SGBs has undermined the
efficacy of these local democratic institutions. Although SGBs were designed to be inclusive platforms for local
decision-making, their school financing role has transformed them into business centers demanding school fees.
Pampallis (1998) describes the ironic result of South Africa’s shift to decentralize educational governance:
The irony is that the very decentralization that has led to greater democratization of schooling by giving
all the main stakeholders a powerful voice in the schools’ affairs, is also contributing to the perpetuation
of inequities among our schools. The new inequalities, however, are increasingly being drawn on class
rather than racial lines. 41
Pampallis is right to observe the increasing importance of class instead of race in determining access to
education. The devolution of financial powers to local SGBs has inhibited integration by framing access to
public schooling as a matter of income and wealth. Rich schools have maintained their quality, while poor
schools are unable to extract even low fees from the surrounding community. On the other hand, Pampallis
suggests that the increase in decentralization is consistent with an increase in democratization. But Pampallis’s
observation assumes that having the legal right to a ‘powerful voice’ equates to one’s ability to exercise a
‘powerful voice.’ Although SASA stipulates the creation of SGBs, the Act does not necessitate local
communities’ immediate and effective use of these new democratic platforms. The data drawn from Fiske and
Ladd, Karlsson, Tikley and Moboagane suggest that the voices of local communities remain unheard to a great
extent. Moreover, the data produced by the Nelson Mandela Foundation explains how the introduction of
school fees has undermined the principle of inclusivity within SGBs that the People’s Education movement
sought to establish.
Returning to Pampallis’s discussion on the introduction of school fees, he notes, “Although school fees
need not be part of a self-governing package, they were seen as a way of giving local governing bodies both
discretionary funds and a major incentive to use funds wisely.” 42 School fees are viewed as an effective market
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incentive in increasing efficiency and competition among schools. According to Chaka, the considerable
pressure on SGBs to fund schools explains why SGBs are more concerned about fundraising and financial
matters and less concerned with educational issues. 43 The use of market mechanisms in the distribution of
education has extended economic inequalities to the educational sphere. Understanding the successes and
failures of school fee policy, the next section assesses outlines the moral limitations of market based reforms in
education policy.

II. The Ethical Framework
The following section explains Anderson’s argument on sphere differentiation. Emphasis is placed on
her discussion of the five market norms, which forms the foundation of my field research. The subsection
entitled, “Is Education Better Valued by Market or Non-Market Norms?” incorporates additional arguments for
the separation of market systems from the schooling system.

Anderson—Ethical Concerns over Market Interventions
In “The Ethical Limitation of the Market,” Anderson explains the important role of the state in limiting
the scope of the market in order to preserve citizens’ freedom and autonomy. Anderson’s argument is based on
an assessment of market exchanges as transactions guided by self-interested norms. She is concerned with the
state’s reliance on markets as a mechanism to distribute public goods and argues that failing to regulate the
market can undermine the way we value shared goods by allowing commercial norms to corrupt the values
within nonmarket domains. 44 By reducing the options through which a citizen can value a particular good and
replacing social norms of valuation, the market limits individual freedom and autonomy.
Since Anderson’s argument centers on the protection of individual freedom and autonomy, a proper
conception of these terms, as understood by Anderson, is required. Anderson defines freedom as having a wide
range of options through which one can express their diverse valuations. Autonomy is understood as the ability
to govern oneself according to the principles one reflectively endorses. 45 Again, Anderson is concerned with
freedom and autonomy in relation to the corruptive influence of market norms. She argues that market norms
stand in contrast to nonmarket valuations in five ways: they are impersonal, egoistic, exclusive, want-based, and
provide ‘exit’ instead of ‘voice’ as a means to influence policy outcomes. 46 In the first instance, economic
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transactions are impersonal, since as Anderson notes, “Money income, not one’s social status, characteristics, or
relationships, determines one’s access to commodities.” 47 Relationships in the market are formed in virtue of
another’s capital, not upon their personal characteristics. Second, market exchanges are guided by egoism,
which Anderson defines as, “When each party defines and satisfies her interests independent of the other.” 48
One involved in market exchanges rarely considers the well-being of the other, so long as their individual wants
are satisfied. In the third case, economic transactions are exclusive since access is limited to the purchaser. 49
Property rights are acquired through the purchase of commodities, which entitles the buyer with the freedom to
exclude whomever he/she chooses. Fourth, economic transactions are want-based in that they satisfy “desires
backed by the ability to pay.” Anderson clarifies her description of want-based norms by noting that the market
does not draw a distinction between one’s “urgent needs” and “intense desires” and satisfies whoever can afford
to trade. 50 Finally, economic transactions also promote exit over voice in that a consumer uses the practice of
exit, or ending business, to instigate change. A customer has no right to directly participate in the design of the
product or to determine how it is marketed. 51
The nature of economic goods and the ‘use’ mode of valuation we associate with these goods conflict
with personal and social valuations common to civil society. 52 Values of compassion, cooperation, and
generosity are replaced by economic norms of impersonality, egoism, and exclusiveness when market systems
enter nonmarket domains. When market norms undermine social values and limit the range of significant
options one can pursue, individual freedom is limited. Similarly, autonomy is compromised when market
valuations replace the options by which one can reflectively endorse. 53
Based on the corruptive influence of market norms, Anderson argues for a system of “sphere
differentiation.” 54 Sphere differentiation involves the separation of goods into multiple spheres, which
preserves distinct modes of valuation. She argues that the practice of boundary setting will protect individual
freedom and autonomy by preserving a range of diverse opportunities for one to value a particular good. 55
Soule succinctly summarizes Anderson’s theory: “Anderson’s aim is freedom and autonomy through protective
spheres that allow goods to be properly valued.” 56 Preventing the infiltration of market norms enables
individuals to freely and autonomously pursue those values they deem important.
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Understanding Anderson’s theoretical framework, she proposes a three-step methodology to determine
whether the state is permitted in regulating market systems. The first step involves determining whether a
particular good is better valued according to market or nonmarket values. If a good is better valued by
nonmarket values, step two asks whether market norms undermine important social values belonging to a
particular good. If market norms corrupt social values, then state regulation is permitted. 57 The next section
looks to satisfy Anderson’s first requirement and argues that educational goods are better valued according to
nonmarket norms.

Is Education Better Valued by Market or Non-Market Norms?
Anderson argues that educational goods are best valued by social norms of democratic values and
fraternal relations. In contrast to market norms, Anderson describes the values underpinning our conception of
education:
Democratic ideals strongly inform our conception of elementary and secondary education. A principal
purpose of education at this level is to prepare children for responsible citizenship, exercised in a spirit
of fraternity with others of diverse class, racial, and ethnic backgrounds. 58
If the purpose of education is to prepare learners for civil engagement and equip them with the necessary skills
to address social ills, what role, if any, do markets have in the educational sphere? Since markets promote
competition by dividing learners according to the ‘ability to pay’ standard, learners are likely to receive an
education without first-hand experiences with learners of different economic classes. Since class is closely tied
to race especially in the South African context, markets undermine the larger aims of education by confining the
“spirit of fraternity” to a homogenous pool of affluent white learners or poorer black learners.
Supporting Anderson’s assessment of democratic conceptions of education, Strain (1995) expresses a
similar concern over the state’s increasing reliance on markets as a vehicle to distribute educational goods.
Basing his argument off of the UK’s Education Reform Act of 1988, Strain argues that markets encourage
schools to manage their affairs like businesses in competition with neighboring schools. Schools compete to sell
education to parent and child consumers. 59 According to Strain, the Education Reform Act conceives of
education as a packaged commodity, void of any intrinsic worth. By distributing education according to
economic standards of production and consumption, the market removes forums of communal participation.
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The lack of local democratic organs undercuts the goals of schooling by promoting individualism over
cooperative fraternal relations.
Returning to Anderson’s analysis of market norms, Strain emphasizes the importance of ‘voice’ and
‘need-based’ values in underpinning our understanding of education. He argues that democratic platforms are
necessary to give individuals a voice to express their educational needs. When deliberations focus on satisfying
the needs of the least advantaged instead of promoting competitive individualism, education can realize its
promotion of democratic ideals. 60 But since the market distributes education in terms of price mechanisms (i.e.
school fees), those with the larger incomes will consume more, even though their needs may be less. 61 Strain’s
analysis reverts back to Anderson’s assessment of markets as mechanisms that do not discriminate between
‘urgent needs’ and ‘intense desires.’ 62 Again, we see how the market fails to provide for the least advantaged.
Instead of education operating as a mechanism to even out class barriers, the introduction of markets into
schooling magnifies these inequalities. Based on the market’s role in limiting voice and need-regarding ideals,
Strain concludes, “Markets, even when heavily regulated and administered, induce effects contrary to the values
of individual and social freedom upon which public education is understood to be founded.” 63
Like Strain’s support for removing markets from the provision of education, Ranson’s (1995) critique
emphasizes the inherently self-interested nature of markets and their role in undermining the larger social aim of
education. 64 Though Ranson’s criticism is directed at the UK’s 1993 Education Act, which calls for a stronger
centrally administered market in education, his critique of market norms speaks to South Africa’s decentralized
local markets for education. As in Anderson’s assessment of markets as egoistic, Ranson argues that the
“individualism of markets” erodes democratic values of cooperative deliberation. 65 The promotion of market
mechanisms is thus inversely related to the promotion of democratic values.
Unique to Ranson’s assessment of markets is a holistic understanding of education as a social institution
designed to prepare learners to address contemporary social ills. Describing the current problems of our society,
Ranson states, “The problems we face [. . .] cannot be resolved by individuals acting in isolation.” Since markets
promote individualism instead of cooperation, matriculates leave school with a hollow understanding of what it
means to engage in collective activism. Markets fail to realize what democracy alone can establish. 66 Ranson
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concludes that if we are committed to preparing learners to address the predicaments of our time, we cannot rely
on markets as a vehicle for distributing access to education.
Perhaps the most formidable obstacle confronting the arguments set forth by Anderson, Strain, and
Ranson, is the libertarian commitment to economic freedom. Philosophers of the libertarian camp argue that
removing the role of markets in education infringes upon a parent’s freedom to invest in their child’s education.
They argue that state involvement limits parent choice by prescribing which school their child must attend and
confining parents to restrictions in locality. 67 They argue additionally that free market are morally superior in
that it creates a system whereby free and voluntary choices in education are secured through individuals acting
according to their own moral and prudential interests. 68
But this narrow conception of freedom fails to recognize how an unregulated market can severely limit
the freedom of poorer individuals. For instance, Ranson describes markets as, “formally neutral but
substantively interested.” 69 In other words, though the market appears to increase parent choice by ‘freeing’
parents from poor local schools in their catchment area, this increase in economic freedom assumes each person
entering the market has the same package of capital upon entering the market. But centuries of black
disenfranchisement have tipped the scale against the black community. When market mechanisms enter the
education sphere, it complicates inequalities in income with inequalities in educational opportunity. As a result,
markets fail to offer disadvantaged communities a fare shake in the educational market. Similarly, Strain argues
that markets assume that society operates within a ‘moral vacuum.’ 70 But as Ranson describes, social agents are
differentiated by virtue of their differences in income, ethnicity, religion, and culture. Libertarians assume that
the actual market is reflective of the ideal market where individuals deliberate on an equal playing field and
naturally sort themselves among various choices in public schools.
A final complication arising from market systems in education is the conservative perspective of
voluntariness with regards to the least advantaged class in society. Describing the market perspective of
educational distribution, Ranson notes, “The market can parade under the guise of neutrality while any ensuing
inequality can hide beneath the illusion that, because the agents have acted, they must also have assented.” 71
Simply because poorer parents choose to send their children to poorer schools does not mean that their choices
are made voluntarily. Inequalities in education cannot be justified simply because parents ‘assented’ to sending
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their children to lower quality schools. This surface level understanding of voluntariness fails to consider the
background conditions that may coerce parents to choose and to act in a certain way. For rural and township
learners, the ‘choice’ in attending poor local schools is not an expression of consent or acceptance of the market
system, but simply a decision made within a forced-option scenario confined by the limitations of school fees
and transportation costs. Based on the normative assessment of educational values and the equality
compromising effects of market based distributions of education, we can conclude that education is better
valued according to nonmarket norms. The next section describes the preliminary steps prior to my field
research in which I attempted to apply the ethical concerns related by Anderson, Ranson, and Strain, to a case
study of a public school in South Durban.

III. Logistics
To restate the goal of my research, it is to answer Anderson’s second question: do market norms corrupt
important social values in education? This section refines my general research question in terms of Anderson’s
framework and then describes the reasons why Durban Academy was selected. I briefly touch upon the school’s
history and transition to a multicultural school since understanding the racial aspects of the Durban Academy
audience is an important consideration when assessing their perspectives on class and education. Included in
this section is a description of the methodologies employed and their accompanying limitations.

Research Aims
Since my initial goal is to determine whether market norms guided Durban Academy’s understanding of
education, I needed first to frame Anderson’s five economic norms in relation to my specific education focus.
Arriving at appropriate questions simplified the field research phase by serving as a guide throughout my study.
The table cross-lists the specific community type with the specific market norm I looked to uncover.
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Figure 3.1
Operationalizing Anderson’s Market Norms

Market Norms

A. SGB
(Producers)

B. Teachers
(Facilitators)

C. Parents / Students
(Consumers)

1. Impersonal

How does the SGB deal with
non-fee paying parents?

Do teachers discriminate
between fee-paying and nonfee paying learners?

How do parents respond to
SGB school fee requests?

2. Egoistic

Does SGB prioritize collection
of school fees over parents’
well-being?

Do teachers exhibit a
preference for higher school
fees?

Are parents focused solely
on their own child’s
development?

3. Exclusive

Is SGB school fee policy
exclusive?

-

-

4. Want-based

Does SGB satisfy needs of
poorer learners?

Do teachers respond to student
needs?

Does parents’ ‘ability to
pay’ determine child’s
access to school?

5. Exit > Voice

Does SGB provide a platform
for parents’ voice?

Do teachers express a desire to
leave DA for a better school?

Assess parent participation
and student decisions to
enter/exit DA.

For sake of clarity in my argument, I categorized the three communities using identifiers that related
each community’s particular role in school operations and their relation to the two other communities. Due to
the administrative and financing role of the SGB in managing the school, they were identified as “producers.”
Teachers became “facilitators” in virtue of their absent role from managing school funds and their intermediary
role between the SGB members and the learners. The parent and student community are best characterized as
“consumers,” who pay school fees for an educational service. i Labeling the communities assisted in the
organization of data and in the construction of a holistic argument that related the challenges each community
faces individually and in relation to the other communities. ii
In addition, in evaluating the data through Anderson’s ethical lens, I recognized that each community
was only capable of exercising market norms in virtue of their particular role in relation to the other two
i

The identifying labels were drawn from Strain’s discussion on school competition and parent consumers (For more
information see Strain (1995), 5).
ii
These labels were not used prior to the research phase in order to avoid relying upon any assumptions heading into the
field.
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communities. For instance, the power to exclude was not invested in the teachers or parent communities, but in
the governing body, while the ability to exit was reserved to teacher and parent/learner communities.
Understanding the broad structure of my argument, I searched for a school that would provide access to these
three communities.

Selecting a School—Durban Academy
Based on the limited duration of my field research, my academic advisor, Johan Wasserman, suggested I
focus on one school for a case study. Johan advised that a case study would provide richer and more in-depth
information regarding the questions I attempted to address. Based on the school’s proximity to my living
accommodations, its unique placement between affluent public schools and poor township schools, and its
diverse student body, I believed Durban Academy would be a suitable choice for my research. When I managed
to contact Principal van Rooijen at the end of March, I committed myself to Durban Academy and postponed
contacting other schools on the Bluff. Once access had been obtained, the more information I gathered on the
school convinced me that I had made the right decision.
Durban Academy is a secondary school located in the working-class Bluff community. The school was
founded in 1957 under the name, Dirkie Uys, in commemoration of the fifteen year-old Voortrekker hero who
died protecting his father in the Battle of Italeni. 72 For forty-years the school carried a strong Afrikaner
tradition. In 1997, the school became a dual medium Afrikaans-English school, which began the initial process
of change in the school’s ethos and student body. Under pressure from the SGB, the school changed its name to
Durban Academy / Akademie on the 1st of April 1997. Today, the school website states, “The staff and students
reflect the rainbow nation.” 73
In addition to the political pressure to integrate Model C schools, the declining numbers of Afrikaner
students fueled Durban Academy’s transition toward a multiracial parallel school. By 1997, the school
enrollment leveled off at around 400 students due to the ‘white flight’ from navy, air force, army, and railway
personnel whose children comprised the majority of enrollees at Durban Academy. As one respondent
explained, “The survival of the school depends on the learners . . . and what good is a school without students.”
The added pressure to maintain enough students to continue employing the teaching staff resulted in the school’s
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decision to become a dual-medium school. The decision to amalgamate with Port Natal, an Afrikaans school in
Pinetown, fell through during the negotiation process.
Although respondents praised the school’s transition to a dual-medium school, interview data revealed
mixed explanations on the motivations behind Durban Academy’s decision to integrate. While interviewees
argued that the former principal had the vision to open enrollment to black township learners, the former
principal himself described the transition process as a “numbers game.” Another respondent who participated in
the decision-making process during the transition phase explained, “Our problem started when the availability of
space in the school got too big. So we had to take in and fill up to keep the teachers. There was just no way to
keep that school Afrikaans and survive.” In addition to Durban Academy’s genuine goal to integrate, the data
suggests that the external political pressures and the internal ‘numbers game’ required Durban Academy to open
access to non-Afrikaans speaking learners in order to survive.
But to discount Durban Academy’s management as bitter-enders opposed to the integration process
would be to overlook the courageous steps the staff took in defying the culturally conservative Bluff
community. One respondent described the social climate immediately following Durban Academy’s decision to
integrate by remarking, “All those people that are struggling now at that time wanted to crucify us. They would
say, ‘How can you do it? How can you do that?’” Additional responses related continued resentment towards
Durban Academy as a school who “sold out to the black community.” Regardless of the motives behind Durban
Academy’s decision to integrate, its current student body is indeed reflective of the rainbow nation.
The history behind Durban Academy’s transition to a multicultural school is important in imagining
how education is perceived from SGB members, staff, and learners at Durban Academy. Though my research
focuses on economic valuations that ignore references to race, since economic status and race are closely
correlated in the South African context, understanding one without the other would fail to understand the
complete picture.

Methods
A few days prior to conducting research at Durban Academy, I had an important meeting with Johan.
Johan emphasized a reflexive approach, encouraged me not to ignore data that fell outside my narrow
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“Anderson lens,” and stressed the social and ethical responsibilities of a field-researcher. Perhaps the single
most important advice Johan provided was to postpone any assumptions that I may have gained during the
literature review and ISP proposal process. Johan’s advice resonated with Glesne’s (2006) suggestion to novice
researchers: “What you know is the basis for the assumptions that preclude you from seeking explanations and
that shut down your depth-probe inclinations.” 74 Johan asked me not to simply conduct a study that proved
Anderson’s argument correct. He asked me to include data that did not fit Anderson’s ethical framework. By
not allowing my research focus to determine the results of my project, I assumed the role of a researcher—that
of a learner.
Concerning the actual methods used, my initial approach to uncovering market values relied upon a
content analysis approach. Johan emphasized the potential gains that could be made through investigating,
“what already exists.” When I was directed to the SGB secretary who then provided access to Durban
Academy’s governing body minutes, I anticipated a smooth-sailing research process. I quickly discovered that
the SGB minutes would not be as informative as I had initially hoped. The heading, “Beheerliggamnotules,”
should have been enough to inform me that the minutes were composed primarily in Afrikaans. For instance, of
the113 pages in the 2001 SGB minutes, only two pages were written in English. Though the hiring of a
translator could have assisted in circumventing this obstacle, it was too expensive and time-consuming an
alternative to yield worthwhile results. The only documents I managed to obtain were the SGB constitution and
school fee exemption forms.
The limitations of the content analysis approach were offset by the interviewing process. Over the fourweek period, I managed to conduct seventeen interviews: nine of whom were affiliated with the SGB or served
finance administrative roles, eight who were teachers, two parents, and one private employee in charge of the
school’s subsidies. iii Access flowed from the top-down, beginning with Mr. van Rooijen’s welcoming
acceptance of my research interests. Through a snow-balling process, I was directed from teacher to teacher and
from one SGB member to the next. In order to avoid researching a homogenous pool of interviewees, I kept
track of the interviewees’ relative age, ethnicity, and personal affiliation or history with the school.

iii

Interviewees often identified with multiple communities, which explains why the sum total of the individual interviewees
adds to more than sixteen (e.g. two teachers were also members of the SGB and the Principal was an SGB member).

23
Since the interviews averaged one to two hours and transcribing the notes placed significant time
burdens on my schedule, I was unable to conduct interviewees with the students. To compensate for this gap in
data collection, I constructed student surveys to administer during batting periods. iv Obtaining parent
perspectives was equally difficult since the parents I wanted to interview were parents of township learners
residing in Umlazi and KwaMashu. Travelling to the townships presented significant time and ethical barriers,
which overrode the potential gains. Fortunately, a parents’ evening coincided with my research, during which I
managed to conduct twenty to thirty informal, unrecorded interviews. v Parent valuations from Bluff community
members were obtained through observant-participation in family braais, informal encounters near the local
restaurant, and during commuting trips to and from the school.
Ethical considerations were limited by the nature of my research and the respondents I managed to
contact. Privacy, voluntariness, and confidentiality were secured during the interviewing phase through
informed consent forms. Each respondent was asked to first read and sign the form, which related my research
interests and ensured their right to exit during the interview. In addition, I verbally expressed my commitment
to ensuring their personal privacy prior to the start of each interview. Though the ethical procedures
occasionally challenged my ability to establish rapport with the respondents, only on one rare occasion did the
interviewee remain distant and removed from my research aims.

IV. Findings
As indicated by Figure 3.1, research findings are organized by community instead of theme. Explaining
Anderson’s notion of sphere differentiation becomes clearer when arranging the argument by community type.
Although the SGB should not be governed by market norms in the first place, the findings express a need to
establish barriers between the financial organs of SGBs and teacher and parent/student communities. Under
each community type are subheadings relating the particular norm under investigation. Understanding the
structure of my argument, we begin with an assessment of the SGB community.

iv

Batting periods were free periods during teacher absences. In only one of the classes did the teacher leave an assignment
for the learners in which I withheld administering the survey.
v
Additional commentary on the parents evening is described in the next section under subsection “Community 3.”
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Community 1—Market Norms in the ‘Cost and Budgeting’ SGB
Since SASA places the onus of school financing on SGBs, one would expect Durban Academy’s SGB
to demonstrate each of Anderson’s five norms. Based on qualitative data, the SGB community demonstrated
mixed valuations of education consistent with both market and nonmarket norms. Though the SGB community
was not exclusive nor want-regarding, opening admissions to township learners required an impersonal and
businesslike approach in dealing with non-fee paying parents. The practices of blacklisting and the offer system
were used to compensate for the lack of funds received from township learners, transforming the SGB into an
impersonal budgeting center.

Meeting the Needs of the Wider Community—SGB Admissions Policy
Based on Durban Academy’s diverse student body, one immediately recognizes the inclusive
admissions policy set by the SGB. In contrast to other former Model C schools, Durban Academy works to set
school fees at a level that best approximates the wealth of the enrollees. Principal van Rooijen described the
makeup of Durban Academy students and the challenges that inclusive admissions policies often bring: “Money
wise we have problems. We don’t serve an affluent community. We serve people from all over the board. You
know from rural areas from townships, which means you can only get so much money and you have to live with
that.” By prioritizing the needs of poorer learners over financial efficiency, Durban Academy has defied the
norms of a typical market system.
But even more than simply surviving the challenges of a more open admissions policy, Durban
Academy has raised a new standard of acceptance that even the neighboring middle-class Grosvenor schools
have not been able to meet. Describing Durban Academy’s inclusive admissions policy, one parent remarked,
“Durban Academy will take the kid no other school will take.” Accepting non-fee payers has come at an
expensive cost however, by upsetting Durban Academy’s more elite and conservative support base. The former
principal remarked that during the transition phase, even long-term faculty grew increasingly upset with his
decisions to admit poorer black learners. Notice the sincere devotion to including disadvantaged learners
expressed in the former principal’s discussion on whether to exclude township learners:
But where does he go? Where is he going to get a chance in life? We always said, ‘give him a chance,
give him an opportunity.’ Because it is like closing a door, if that door is closed and you can’t come in,
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and there is no opportunity elsewhere, where do you go? Where do you go? Because at other schools,
they won’t even take him. If we can’t change them, then nobody will.
The principal’s closing remark suggests that it was not only a learner’s inability to pay school fees, but the
undisciplined behavior that sparked resentment toward a more inclusive admissions policy. But this fact only
strengthens the courage required by Durban Academy to blaze a new path in an inclusive admission policy.
Working in tandem with the SGB’s inclusive admissions policy is the exercise of needs-regarding
norms. Discussion on school fees reflected a similar commitment to maintaining a low cost of school fees in
order to include disadvantaged learners. Again adopting an inclusive approach, Principal van Rooijen remarked,
“There are suggestions of putting it up a lot, but it’s unfair.” While some schools prioritize quality concerns
over fairness, Principal van Rooijen has opted instead to sacrifice quality gains for a more diverse student body.
Once again, Durban Academy’s needs-based approach is even more admirable when considering the mounting
opposition the SGB has faced in relation to its school fee policy. One SGB member described the wider
community’s perception of Durban Academy’ s school fees: “So many parents and even the teachers are on our
backs because our school fees are so low. I’ll say about 50% of our school children come from Umlazi because
our school fees are so low.” Umlazi is a black township located southwest of the Bluff. Due to a lack of quality
education in the townships and the higher cost of school fees at the neighboring Grosvenor Boys and Grosvenor
Girls, Durban Academy’s enrollment currently totals 800 learners. Both Grosvenor schools average around 600
learners with school fees priced at around R2000 more than Durban Academy.

Why Market Norms Come into Play—the Demands Placed on School SGBs
While Durban Academy has committed itself to addressing the needs of township learners,
accommodating students from poorer families has come at a heavy cost by increasing the financial burden on its
SGB and finance committee. According to the SGB secretary, only 40% of learners pay school fees. vi In order
to offset the majority of learners who attend Durban Academy, the SGB is forced to adopt a strict, businesslike
approach to retaining funds. Since the school’s survival depends on the effectiveness of the SGB to collect
school fees, it is without surprise that interviews with SGB members revealed an impersonal and egoistic
vi

The percentage is a rough estimate calculated by adding the sum total of school fee payments and divided by the total
number of learners. Thus, more than 40% of learners are likely paying, but not at the total cost of school fees (i.e. 100% of
learners could be paying, but at a rate subsidized by 60%).
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approach in handling non-fee paying parents. The methods of blacklisting and the “offer system” are two means
that have been adopted by the SGB community in order to ensure the survival of the school.
What was initially referred to as “the cycle” was probed further and identified as the blacklisting
process. Blacklisting involves removing the ability of non-fee paying parents to receive a future loan.
According to the school’s bursar, 95% of non-fee paying parents are blacklisted. Section 41 of the SASA
stipulates, “The governing body of a public school may by process of law enforce the payment of school fees by
parents who are liable to pay in §40.” 75 Section 40 outlines exemption status for eligible parents. If a parent is
not exempt from paying school fees and refuses to pay, the SGB begins blacklisting parents through their
affiliated private debt collectors. The school’s bursar estimates that “old school fees,” which are funds obtained
through blacklisting parents five to ten years after their child has matriculated, account for approximately
R60,000 of the school’s annual budget.
While blacklisting is an efficient and arguably necessary means for Durban Academy to retain school
funds from non-fee paying parents, it is a practice dominated by impersonal and egoistic norms. When asked if
blacklisted parents ever approached the SGB, one SGB member replied, “They sometimes do. But the thing is
you don’t take them off that. Because as soon as you break that cycle, you have to restart the cycle. So if he
doesn’t pay, the debt collector will come knocking on his door.” For this SGB member, the need to collect
school fees forces him to prioritize efficiency gains over parent concerns. Instead of cooperating with parents
and working to accommodate their specific issues in a personable fashion, the SGB must adopt an iron façade to
ensure the school’s survival. It is what one SGB member described as “running a tight ship.”
An exact figure of the number of parents who are blacklisted each year was not discovered. But when
asked how many parents were handed over to the debt collectors each year, the finance secretary replied, “A lot,
a lot. I can’t even think. We hand over every year.” The demands placed on SGB members demands a
stringent approach to working with non-fee paying parents. Again describing the inability of the SGB to make
exceptions, one member replied, “A lot of people will phone us and say, ‘Hey I want to borrow money, but I’m
blacklisted.’ ‘Pay, pay, pay your accounts! We can’t take them off until they’ve paid.”
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But particularly troubling to the blacklisting process is the mixing of private interests in the funding of
schools. Durban Academy’s relationship with a private debt collecting company is best explained in the words
of one SGB member:
We need that money, so if people don’t pay our school fees then Ms. X jacks them up and says listen,
‘Why didn’t you pay your school fees.’ Once we can’t get it out of her then we just hand it over to debt
collectors. But obviously we also pay for the debt collectors. Any money we collect, we have to pay
them 20%. They are helping us, but we are helping them as well. That’s their job . . . they just collect
money all the time. So when we hand over, they try to get as much as they can from us because it
means money for them.
Consider first the demands placed on the SGB. The opening line, “We need that money,” relates the arduous
task burdened upon SGB members in collecting school fees. Since an inefficient SGB equates to a poorly
funded school, and a poorly funded schools is often a poor quality school, each SGB member is forced to
approach non-fee paying parents from a business standpoint. In the interviews conducted with the SGB
community, each member related an understanding of their important role in sustaining school operations.
Consider next the mixing of private interests. If a company’s profitability is dependent on blacklisting parents,
then the incentive for private debt collectors is to maintain a pool of non-fee paying parents. Instead of working
to decrease the number of blacklisted parents, private companies like Durban Academy’s debt collectors,
incentivize low levels of school fee payment for their personal interests. Thus, funding is complicated by
individuals who “just collect money all the time.”
In spite of their market approach to dealing with non-fee paying parents, SGB members presented a dual
personality: on the one hand an impersonal and rigid persona demanded by their profession, and on the other, a
sincere sense of compassion and pity for those blacklisted parents who returned asking for exemption. The
finance secretary described her feelings on blacklisting parents: “I’ll be quite honest with you, we don’t like
handing over our parents. But then again, you can help the parents so far and no more. And then they have just
got to face the consequences after that. There is nothing we can do. We’ve tried to help them.” SGBs operate
within a financial straightjacket, which forbids compassion and outlaws personal relations. In a case study of
Gauteng SGBs, Dieltiens et al. note a similar observation of the burdens placed on SGB members: “For schools
serving impoverished communities, the burden of establishing, retrieving, and exempting parents from paying
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fees is particularly onerous. SGBs have become cost and budgeting centers.” 76 As Dieltiens et al. suggest, the
cost and budgeting requirements of SGBs force SGB members to prioritize their professional role over their
personal role.
Two responses from two different SGB members expound upon Dieltiens et al.’s observation. One
SGB member described blacklisting as the most difficult and trying aspect of her profession:
The hardest part is handing people over. We’ve had people come here crying and saying, ‘I can’t get a
loan, I need to pay my debts, but I can’t because I’m blacklisted.’ So it is very hard when they come
and say, ‘Please take us off the blacklist.’ But you can’t do that. You do it for one and you have to do it
for everyone.”
For this SGB member, it is as if she strives to exercise social norms, but is trapped inside the impersonal and
egoistic domain of market relations. Similarly, the head of the SGB stressed how unfortunate it was to have to
blacklist parents: “We have to be rigid and it’s unfortunate. It is so unfortunate really.” In running a “tight
ship,” the SGB is forced to blacklist non-fee paying parents in order to keep the institution afloat.
Returning to a macroscopic analysis of school funding, one might ask why we are defending non-fee
paying parents. This essay does not legitimate non-fee paying parents, but criticizes the fashion in which these
non-payers are dealt with by SGBs. Based on the data gained from Durban Academy’s SGB, we find that
instead of incorporating parent voices and uniting the community, the school fee requirements of SGBs leads to
a demise of fraternal values and a fragmentation of school and parent communities. To reiterate the criticisms
of this section, it is not the individual SGB members that need reforming, but the local markets for public
schooling.

Egoism and the Offer System
In addition to blacklisting, Durban Academy’s SGB is forced to adopt a second alternative method to
ensure a sufficient amount of school fees are retained. What will be referred to as the “offer system,” concerns a
single line attached to the national school fee-exemption form that allows Durban Academy to acquire funds
from families who are completely exempt from paying school fees. First, this section outlines the exemption
process and then provides an analysis of the school bursar’s role in transforming the offer into a legal statement.
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Finally, a description of the bursar’s particular role in school fee policy is assessed in relation to Anderson’s
critique of market norms.
At the beginning of the year, exemption forms are sent home with the learners and are reviewed by the
finance secretary. The sooner exemption forms can be administered and returned, the earlier the school can
begin collecting offers for the school year. In addition to providing pay slips and disclosing their entire financial
background, parents applying for exemption must respond to the question: “If you are not able to pay the full
school fees, state the amount that you are able to pay.” The provision is not apart of the national exemption
form, but could be considered an extension of SASA’s elastic clause as noted in §36:
A governing body of a public school must take all reasonable measures within its means to supplement
the resources supplied by the State in order to improve the quality of education provided by the schools
to all learners at the school [emphasis added]. 77
When the exemption forms are returned, the finance department sends the forms to the school bursar who
computes a legitimate offer on the basis of the applicant’s income. The bursar then sends an “acknowledgment
of debt agreement” back to the parents with the adjusted offer. Once the document is signed, it is an official
legal document whereby the school can take parents to court if a parent fails to comply.
The offer system is guided by impersonal and egoistic market norms. It is impersonal in its handling of
exempted parents and egoistic in terms of prioritizing the school’s financial needs over a parent’s condition.
The underhanded methods behind the offer system are clarified in one SGB member’s statement:
In other words, what happens here is that he doesn’t have to pay a cent. But he has offered to pay R50
per month. We are a little bit cheeky, I’ll tell you why. On the form we put there, ‘If you are not able to
pay the full school fees, state the amount that you are able to pay.’ And then we hold them against it.
We will accept that offer because they actually don’t have to pay us a cent. We just try to get something
out of them.
This particular SGB member approaches exempted parents as a trading partner in a business transaction and
attempts to maximize profit on behalf of the school. Another SGB member described the offer system
according to market norms: “That one line, we put it in because there are a lot of kids that are actually exempt
from paying school fees. But you think to yourself, ‘Why must the others carry them?’ If they are prepared to
pay R50 a month, let them pay R50 a month.” Cooperation is submerged beneath competition, as local
governing bodies are forced to fund schools and take “all reasonable measures” to supplement state funds.
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But the offer system is not a passive mechanism that asks parents to voluntarily follow through on an
offered payment. Perhaps the cruelest aspect of the offer system is the way legally exempt parents can be legally
bound to pay their offered amount. So while a parent may be exempt from paying R5720 a year, he/she can be
bound to pay whatever amount is offered in the exemption form. Describing the conversion of a parent’s offer
into a legally binding document, the school bursar stated, “It’s voluntary, but I turn it into a legal document.
They, I didn’t, they make the decision. I then drew up a legal document, which they signed, so they are
committed to that amount. There is no escape from that. No escape.” But how is the offer voluntary if the
proposed amount is adjusted to the bursar’s computed sum of what should constitute an ‘appropriate offer’?
The SGB’s twisted notion of voluntariness penalizes exempt parents, but based once again, on the considerable
demands placed on SGBs.
The rigid impersonality and egoism of the offer system only sinks deeper as the details are brought to
light. The bursar described the process that takes place if a parent offers more than the calculated amount:
So if the offer is more I hold onto the offer. I don’t show them that they actually should pay less.
Because the schools Act allows me to negotiate with parents. So that amount they put in there, I assume
they’ve worked out their budget. That is the amount I claim from them in court if they don’t pay it.
SASA legalizes SGB’s attempts to legally bind exempted parents to pay an offered amount. Interview data
identified cases of pensioners who received R800 a month being held legally accountable to pay a R150 offer.

Business as SASA Dictates—Recap of SGB Community
In review of Community 1, the SGB operates according to a mix of market and nonmarket norms. As
the blacklisting and offer methods relate, Anderson’s five market norms are not mutually exclusive categories,
but often operate in a web of relationships. The SGB’s inclusive admissions policy demands an impersonality
and egoism in the handling of non-fee paying and exempted parents. With the obligation of retaining school
fees placed on the SGB, market norms are required for the successful upkeep of school operations. As one SGB
member stated, “You know a school is a business. You can’t run a school without capital.” And if building
capital is the SGB’s responsibility, operating along business norms is a necessary extension of their role.
Ranson describes the way market systems illicit economic norms in individuals: “The point is not that
individuals are by nature possessively self-interested, but that the institutions of the market make them so.” 78

31
The demands that are placed upon SGBs and financial secretaries manifest within these financiers, the egoistic
and impersonal norms that should have no role in education. It is the system, not the individuals that needs
restructuring.
The most disconcerting finding within the SGB was recognition of how its role as a inclusive
democratic organ has been subverted by market norms. Instead of serving as an inviting platform for
communities to decide collectively on school-related issues, the financial and managerial role of the SGB
divides the school and the surrounding community. One SGB member related stories of parents who refused to
answer their cell phones and who changed their SIM cards to avoid debt-collecting calls from the school.
Another SGB member explained that parents often “hop” from school to avoid debt collectors. Finally, one
SGB member described parent response to blacklisting by stating, “You try to tell them that it is for the school,
but they take it personally.” The attachment of school fee policy to SGB responsibilities has undermined the
freedom of SGBs to value education as a social good with the community as opposed to against the community.
Personal interactions between SGB members and parents are replaced with exemption forms, which is as one
SGB member remarked, “[This is] how we get to know the parents.” The impersonal and businesslike relations
between the SGB and the parent community might explain low levels of parent involvement. vii
Considering our market assessment of Durban Academy’s SGB, we can estimate how finances are
handled by SGBs in richer and poorer schools. For former Model C schools still offering top-quality education,
market norms of exclusion and want-based ideals are likely to inform their admissions policies. Quality public
schools like Glenwood and Durban High School have been criticized for catering solely to the emerging black
middle class, while ignoring the greater needs of poorer township learners. Though the number of non-fee
paying parents may be lower in these more affluent public schools, Durban Academy SGB members related that
blacklisting and the offer system was used more readily in these schools. In fact, one SGB member described
the perspective of non-fee paying parents by remarking, “We heard a lot of parents say, ‘We send our children
here because we reasonable.’” If Durban Academy’s blacklisting and offers methods are considered reasonable,
once can only estimate what SGB operations may look like within more affluent institutions.

vii

Discussed further in Community 3, subsection “Commuting Learners—Explaining Low Levels of Parent Voice through
Learner Exit.”
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At the other end of the spectrum are the SGBs in poorer schools. For SGBs in townships and rural
areas, the ability to exercise market norms is limited by the wealth of the surrounding community and the
capacity of SGBs. The blacklisting “cycle” requires a minimum of five to ten years of steady recordkeeping in
order to yield any benefits from “old-school funds.” Moreover, the offer system is moot without the hiring of a
school bursar who can aggressively assess exemption forms, transform offers into legal documents, and attend
court trials when necessary. One SGB member described her perception of finances in poorer schools by
remarking, “I don’t think they got systems that really run. If they have computers, I don’t think they know how
to run them. You can still get away in your cash books, but I don’t know I haven’t been there.” Though this
case study is limited in its scope and knowledge of SGBs in poorer communities, if anything, the analysis of
Durban Academy’s SGB identifies the complexity and sophistication of SGB operations, which may be beyond
the capacity of SGBs in poorer communities. Understanding the ways in which market norms guide SGB
operations, the next section assesses whether these valuations flow into the teaching community.

Community 2: Preserving Social Norms in the Teaching Community
Although the SGB community demonstrated a reliance on market norms, SGB members described their
separation from “in-house” or classroom operations. For instance, one SGB member described her role in
relation to the teaching staff: “We don’t get involved in the day to day running of the school. It is not our
responsibility.” Based on the interview data from the SGB community, Durban Academy seems to model
Anderson’s notion of sphere differentiation. The market norms within the SGB sphere are contained by the
barriers between the SGB’s financial role and the teaching staff’s educational responsibilities. But in order to
offer a conclusive assessment of teacher valuations of education, an assessment of school fees from the teachers'
perspective is required to either support or negate the SGB observations. Based on data gained from eight
teacher interviews, the teaching community revealed little to no reliance on market norms. In terms of
Anderson’s framework, the teachers emphasized three social norms: 1) an absence of egoism, prioritizing
student needs over better resources and smaller class sizes, 2) a personal approach to education that looked
fulfill learners’ parenting needs, and finally, 3) exercising voice instead of exit by opting to stay at Durban
Academy and grapple with the challenges of teaching at a multicultural school.
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Prioritizing Student Needs over Teacher Wants
In the first instance, teachers prioritized student needs over a better resourced school and smaller class
sizes. While they admitted their preferences for overhead projectors, dry-erase boards, new desks, and airconditioning, only one of the eight teachers recommended an increase in school fees to make these changes
possible. Egoism, understood as “teacher’s wants,” was placed beneath the students’ needs. One teacher
described her preferences in relation to wealthier public schools, but acknowledged the feasibility of new
resources considering the financial status of learners’ families:
You know it would be nice. If you look at a school like Glenwood, and they pay astronomical amounts
of school fees and what makes it nice is they have got all the resources of a private school. And it
would be nice to have it here, but I don’t think that the people that enroll here can afford more than that
actually.
Teachers were hesitant to raise school fees based on the economic background of a majority of their learners.
While school fee increases could relieve them of large class sizes and under-resourced classrooms, teachers
were willing to cope with these inconveniences in order to accommodate township learners.

Preserving Personal Relations in the Classroom
Regarding personal relations within the classroom, teachers expressed a desire to spend more time with
their learners, but were forced to deal with the practical constraints of large class sizes. Thus, personal relations
within the teaching community were expressed more as a desire, than an actual exercise of personal norms. For
the purposes of our study however, teachers' motivations and valuations of education are equally important to
their actual practices. viii The teachers’ personal approach to learners is best captured in one educator’s
statement: “Being a teacher you can’t do as much as you would like. You would like to go around and ask each
child, ‘Do you have a problem?’ But you don’t get the chance to go and do something like that.” Although time
constraints and class size inhibited the development of teacher-student relationships, these obstacles did not
undermine educators’ desire to reach through to their learners.
In addition to teachers’ desire to spend more individual time with learners, they expressed a willingness
to assume a parenting or social worker role in their learners’ lives. Educators described the “several roles” of
viii

This observation does not discount the presence of personal interactions between teachers and students.
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teachers in filling the void in parent involvement, counseling students after working hours, and assisting them in
future career or job opportunities. Teachers were distressed by the inability to assist children in need. One
respondent described the most difficult part of her job as her inability to counsel students:
You know, when we had smaller classes, we knew more about the kids. You know, now you could see
them sitting here, but you wouldn’t know that they are being abused all the time because you don’t have
that kind of knowledge. There are a lot of kids who need help, but you never know unless they come to
you.
Stories of student rape victims and suicide attempts were related in teacher interviews. Each time these cases
were referenced, teachers expressed a longing to assist students and offer whatever support or parenting
guidance they could provide.

Opting to Stay—Teachers’ Absence of Exit
Perhaps the most important social norm concerning teacher valuations of education was the teachers’
exercise of voice instead of exit. Though the motivations underlying Durban Academy’s transition to a
multiracial school are debatable, educators’ reactions to the changes revealed a commitment to improving the
quality of the school. Principal van Rooijen’s description of the personal challenges to teaching in a multiracial
school reveal his unwillingness to exit: “I think I took about six months to adapt and to feel free and happy . . .
in the beginning it was hard because I had been teaching so long, for so many years in my own language, but
everybody learns.” Supporting the principal’s exercise of voice, another teacher remarked, “I am very happy
that this school became a multi-racial school. And I feel blessed that I teach in a school where there is a crosssection of the community. Yes, it is hard at times, but you learn to adapt.” While white flight from the
conservative Bluff community was common in the 1990s, Durban Academy teachers not only decided to stay on
the Bluff, but chose to continue teaching at an institution undergoing drastic changes in student demographics,
resources, and school culture.
Supporting teachers’ commitment to improving the quality of education at Durban Academy is the low
salary that they receive. One respondent expressed her frustrations with the pay, but then retracted her comment
by describing her commitment to teaching: “The salary is pathetic. Its peanuts. But we are not working for the
money. It is your love for kids that makes you stay.” The willingness of the staff to grapple with Durban
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Academy’s transition to a dual medium school and to devote their time and energy to develop successful
learners demonstrates the democratic norm of voice over exit.

Recap of Teaching Community
The preservation of social norms in the teaching community correlates with their low involvement in
financial affairs. One teacher described her involvement with school finance issues by remarking, “Not at all.
You don’t have to be involved with payments and that is nice. If a child doesn’t pay his school fees, you don’t
get involved with that, you don’t even know if he is behind on his payments.” Each teacher interviewed
reflected a similar detachment from finance issues, which was consistent with Principal van Rooijen’s statement
that teachers are employed to teach, not to collect school fees. Moreover, teachers who provided assessments of
school fee statistics were often incorrect, which strengthened the conclusion that teachers are separated from
school financing issues.
Based on the case study of teachers at Durban Academy, we can extend our analysis of social norms in
the teaching community to educators in richer and poorer areas. In the first case, since more affluent schools
have strong parent involvement, powerful governing bodies, and a steady supply of school fees to employ
additional financial secretaries and governing body educators, teacher involvement with financial issues is
likely to be even less than at Durban Academy. In addition, increased staffing would allow teachers to develop
personal relations with students in smaller classes. The “several roles” of teachers become specialized to suit
their normative role as educators within the classroom.
Teachers in poorer schools are likely to demonstrate the opposite effect. Since poorer schools lack the
capital to hire additional staff members to manage the school’s finances, teachers will be required to fill this
financial responsibility. Complicating matters is the capacity of SGBs in poorer areas to fill the void. Chaka
observes that teachers are often the most vocal members in SGBs due to the incapacity and lack of involvement
from the parent community. 79 So if SGBs are governed by market norms in virtue of their financial roles, and
if teachers in poorer areas comprise the main voices in SGBs, what values are learners in townships and the
rural areas exposed to within the classroom? The barriers between SGB and teacher roles appear to crumble in
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poorer schools. In addition to the mixing of market and nonmarket norms, large class sizes in poorer schools
inhibits teachers’ ability to develop personal student-teacher relations.
Returning to the case study of Durban Academy, determining whether regulation of South Africa’s
education market is necessary requires an analysis of student valuations. The aim of the following section can
be understood in terms of the preliminary conclusions we have made thus far: do the market norms of SGBs or
the social norms within the classroom have a greater effect on parent and student valuations of education?

Community 3—The Convoluted Educational Market: Parent and Student Perspectives
Analysis of parent and student valuations demonstrated a reliance on market norms linked to the
financial role of the SGB. Due to the wide variation of socioeconomic status within the parent community
further differentiation within the community was required. For instance, for black township families, exit
equates to entrance into Durban Academy, whereas for wealthier Bluff families, exit means leaving Durban
Academy and enrolling in alternative public schools or elite private schools. In both cases however, the learners
suffer by means of long distance commutes and limited interaction with peers of different socioeconomic
statuses and cultures. But the massive learner migration has had a detrimental impact on parents’ voice as well.
For black township parents, voice is denied by public transportation limitations. Learner exit also draws
concerns between Bluff parent’s freedom and their children’s autonomy. In the post-apartheid education
market, parents are capable of exercising exit and enrolling their child in a school reflective of their particular
values, thus filtering the types of knowledge a child is exposed to. The first two subsections entitled, “Township
Exit” and “Explaining Low Levels of Parent Voice through Learner Exit” focus primarily on the poorer, black
commuting group of learners. The following two subsections entitled, “Want Based Explanations for Low
Parent Involvement” and “Egoism, Exit, and Parent Socialization” are more specific to the affluent, white, noncommuting parent/learner community.

Township Exit and the Selection of Durban Academy
While much attention has been devoted to the white flight from former Model C schools into private
institutions, a similar migration of learners has occurred from township and rural schools to urban former Model
C schools. Since SASA’s provision of school fees has maintained the divide in school quality between former
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black and white schools, parents and learners strive to enroll in the highest quality schools they can afford. For
poorer black learners, selecting a school in the South Africa’s education market is a matter of locating an
affordable school beyond the townships. Exit from township learners is directly linked to their parent’s wealth.
While democratic values may be taught in the classroom, these norms are undermined by learners’ first-hand
experiences of what money can buy.

Figure 3.2
'Township School in the Suburbs': Geographic Breakdown of
Durban Academy Learners

32%

68%

Commuting Learners*

Non-Commuting Learners**

__________________________________________________________________________________________
The title, “Township School in the Suburbs” drawn from Chisholm, 258.
*Commuting Learners include those learners residing in: Umlazi, Lamontville, KwaMashu, Isipingo, Mobeni Heights,
Newlands, Austerville, Clairwood, Woodlands, Sea View, Wentworth, and Merewent.
**Non-Commuting Learners include those learners from: Bluff, Brighton Beach, Fynnlands, Ocean View, Marlboroug, and
Grosvenor.
Dividing learners into “Commuting” and “Non-Commuting” camps is subject to interpretation. While subjective
limitations are acknowledged, researcher’s break-down of learners was drawn from interview data and cross-checked with
approval of SGB members.

__________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3.2 above identifies the mass-learner migration occurring at Durban Academy. Of the 798
enrollees, 544 (68%) commute from townships located off the Bluff. Only 254 learners (32%) reside on the
Bluff. The most common explanation interviewees provided for the massive influx of learners was that the

38
quality of education in the townships was poor. ix SGB members, teachers, parents, and students each related the
problems of township schools by making a reference to either one of the issues that include: poor structure of
the school, limited resources, overcrowding, violence, unqualified teachers, lack of teacher motivation, teacher
union strikes, and corporal punishment.
Teachers who commented on the quality of township schools often lacked first-hand accounts, but
managed to construct an image of schooling based on second hand experiences from educator colleagues. In a
discussion on transportation issues, one Durban Academy teacher described why he believed learners’ exited
from township schools:
You know, but a lot of people will argue, ‘Why don’t you go to schools closer to your own
neighborhood?’ But you find that a lot of those schools aren’t functioning at the level that they should
be functioning. So you find a parent is looking for a school where they know their child will be taught
proper.
A majority of the respondents’ explanations for township exit resonated with the above-mentioned statement.
One Durban Academy teacher went so far as to say that learners commute to the Bluff simply because at
township schools, “nothing happens there.” The parent’s observation echoes Tikly and Mabogoane’s
description of township schools and the ‘choice’ these parents have:
“For many black communities living in black areas, ‘choice’ of school has been severely limited (to the
point of becoming almost meaningless) by overcrowding and by a shortage of accessible schools. [ . . .]
It is these glaring inadequacies of the historically black system that have made historically white schools
the only meaningful choice open to many black parents despite the long distances and rising
transportation costs often involved.” 80
Based on Tikley and Mobogoane’s assessment of township schools, Durban Academy is not a unique case, but a
school reflective of the greater learner migration occurring throughout South Africa.
Returning to the case study, data on parent and student motivations was again limited by the ability to
meet and interact with these communities due to informed consent form limitations and the inability to establish
meetings or interviews with parents. x To substitute for the gap in data, teacher perspectives were used based on
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Due to time constraints, secondary sources were used to develop a conception of the “township school.” While the essay
lacks empirical research at township schools, teacher perspectives were assessed in combination with commuting learners’
impressions of their local schools.
x
While principal van Rooijen located potential student respondents, time limitations convinced me that I would not be able
to gain a reasonable cross-section of the students. In weeks two and three, I decided instead to focus on teacher interviews
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an assumption that teachers managed to gain insight into student lives that extended beyond the academic
setting. For instance, one teacher described learner decisions to exit by recalling an encounter he had with a
township learner:
They are in a sense running away from the schools nearby their homes. I call it ‘runaway’ because they
know that the teachers are either not there, or they do not do the work properly. I mean . . . I can name
learners who came here from other townships who said, ‘Please sir, I can’t carry on like this. I want to
do something with my life.’
In addition to student desires to exit township schools, parent motivations played a premier role in student’s
decision to enroll in Durban Academy. In response to a survey questionnaire question which asked students
whether their parents’ preference determined their decision to attend Durban Academy, 70% of the learners
responded “Strongly Agree” or “Agree” with the statement. xi
Assuming the student responses are an accurate representation of the factors determining which school
they attended, it then became important to assess parent motivations in selecting Durban Academy. Interactions
with the parent community revealed several variables behind their selection of Durban Academy: discipline,
school’s history, languages offered, cost of school fees, and the poor quality of local schools. xii Again, the
quality of education in local areas was one of the primary reasons parents were willing to send their children
long distances to public schools in the suburbs.
Informal interview data with parents was supplemented by teacher responses on parent motivations.
Describing the mindset of township parents in selecting a school, one teacher stated, “They want their kids to be
better. They don’t want their kids to be domestics. They are not getting them in the black schools, so they bus
them out.” Similarly, another respondent assumed that parents immediately consider the Bluff when looking to
exit township schools. She described the selection process from the perspective of a poor black parent: “If you
are a black parent, you get a low wage, and you are looking for a high school. You go to Grosvenor Boys then

while administering student surveys to batting classes (free periods in teacher absences). Survey limitations developed as a
result of unclear explanations of the variables I was testing. A revised survey was construction to circumvent the problem
(see Appendix C)
xi
Survey was a random sampling survey. Data is taken from commuting learners only (which comprised of forty-eight
learners commuting from locations referenced in Figure 1.1).
xii
Parent responses from parents’ evening are limited by the cross-section of parents who were able to attend. The next
section goes into greater detail regarding the way student exit has decreased parent voice.
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to Grosvenor Girls, then to Durban Academy. And since we have the lowest school fees, you come here.” The
quality and affordability of Durban Academy explains the school’s high percentage of township learners.
But what does the selection of Durban Academy mean for commuting learners? In response to the
open-ended survey question, which asked, “If you were headmaster of Durban Academy, what would you
change, if anything?” students commented on solutions to their daily transportation difficulties. One learner
expressed his concerns over the wasted hours spent commuting and stated, “I would get a skool bus so that we
don’t have to use public transport an waste time.” In addition, parents living on the Bluff often related stories of
Durban Academy learners waiting at the bus stop from two o’clock when school ended, until five o’clock when
the bus fares were cheapest. While the SGB staff acknowledged the transportation issues, funding a school bus
was beyond the school’s budget.
Although student responses are important in informing our assessment of the challenges arising from
student exit, one teacher provided an important perspective on the obstacles facing commuting learners: “They
travel an hour maybe an hour and a half just to get to school. And they come here and they are tired. I can’t
blame them for that. Now they’ve got a full school day and they get home when it is almost turning dark again.
There is a vicious circle and it is just going to get bigger and bigger.” Long hours of commuting might explain
the lack of student motivation. Students would describe their week-day routine, which begins at 4am and ends
at 8pm. Homework was an afterthought for most of the learners commuting from Isipingo, KwaMashu, and far
sections of Umlazi.

Commuting Learners—Explaining Low Levels of Parent Voice through Learner Exit
While long distance commutes have placed an extra burden on township learners’ social and academic
growth, the school’s distance from the township communities has hampered parents’ exercise of voice.
Although SGBs were designed to foster local democratic participation, since 68% of the students do not live in
the surrounding Bluff community there has been a fragmentation of communal involvement. Distance would
not be an obstacle to township parents had it not been for by South Africa’s poor transport system and the
inability of poorer parents to find the time between multiple jobs.
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At parents’ evening, a few mothers commuting from KwaMashu had not even planned their return route
home. They were the first to arrive in the teacher’s hall and were anxious to meet their son’s or daughter’s
teachers first in order to catch a ride home while the minibus taxis were still operating. Supporting this
ethnographic account is teacher and SGB impressions of the hard-working lives of township parents. One SGB
member described the low parent involvement as a result of their larger social and economic problems: “Maybe
ten percent of parents might be involved, but even that is high. And I think it is also because they are struggling
to survive.” Supporting the SGB member’s statement, one teacher described what he believed was the average
working day of a township parent:
I mean if you take parents that work in Umlazi in this modern time of ours, he still has to get up at four
o’clock in the morning and be at work by seven o’clock. So, just track the time . . . if he leaves at half
past four or five o’clock in the evening . . . once he’s finished working, he gets home at seven o’clock or
half past seven in the evening. Who’s going to come to school still? Where is he going to have the time
for that? It is actually a very sad thing to see . . . the involvement of the parents.
Student exit is thus inversely related to parents’ voice. Of the sixteen parents questioned during parent’s
evening only five were from commuting locations. The overall atmosphere during parents’ evening was one of
frustration expressed from the teaching community. Conditioned to the low parent involvement, teachers related
the common problem of parents’ evening by stating, “And the parents you need to speak with are the ones that
never show up.” The problems township learners face in the classroom are aggravated by the inability of
parents to support their children outside of the classroom.
Low parent-involvement presents autonomy concerns as well when assessing the decision-making
process within SGBs. Durban Academy’s 2009 SGB is entirely Afrikaner, but not out of a malevolent or
exclusionary policy. Explaining his failed attempts in recruiting township parents, the SGB chairperson stated,
“We try to get the black demographics on the governing body, but it is just too hard. You just don’t get them . .
. it is difficult for them to get there unfortunately because our meetings are at nights and there is no public
transport to the Bluff at night.” Principal van Rooijen’s assessment of township parent involvement resonated
with the chairperson’s statement: “I think the day to day living and staying alive and getting money took over so
much of their time that they don’t really get involved. So the parents are allowing people to make decisions for
them and that’s unbelievable.” Parent autonomy is compromised in virtue of their inability to attend meetings
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and voice their opinions. Decisions are made for them not by them. The effects of learner exit thus speak to the
concerns over parent voice and autonomy.
As a transition to the more affluent Bluff community, it is interesting to note the student responses to the
survey question, which asked learners to rank their parents’ involvement in school activities.

Figure 3.3

Figure 3.4
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According to the survey, 41% of commuting learners argued that their parents were “Not Active” with school
affairs. Similarly 37% of non-commuting respondents related the same level of parent non-involvement. The
data suggests that distance might not be the only factor inhibiting parent involvement.

Non-Commuting Learners—Want Based Explanations for Low Parent Involvement
For non-commuting learners then, what explains low parent involvement? Within the non-commuting
parent community, market norms evidence themselves through want-based norms. SGB members explained
that increasing parent participation among Bluff parents was equally as difficult, since parents expected some
type of recompense for their participation in parents’ meetings. xiii On one occasion, the SGB purchased food to

xiii

Want-based norms are used in the description of non-commuting parents’ lack of involvement, but not exclusively.
According to SGB members and teachers, township parents abide by the same culture of ‘I want.’ For clarity purposes
however, since Bluff parents are not challenged (or challenged to a lesser extent) by long-distance commutes and multiple
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increase parent involvement, which did in fact improve parent turnout. One SGB member described low parent
involvement in terms of parents’ want-based norms:
Because of the culture we have in this country, I call it, ‘I want . . . I want . . . Everybody I want.
Because the culture is what can you give me, before I give you something. Part of the challenge is to
get this mindset to change. I mean you can’ t go to Pik ‘N Pay and say, ‘I want bread, or I want the
money.’ It’s the same thing, you have to give to get.
Want-based norms are evidenced from both parent and the SGB perspectives. While parents expect a reward in
return for their participation, the SGB is unwilling to offer anything in exchange without the parents support.
Even if the SGB had the funds to purchase rewards for each parents’ meeting, parent involvement would only
increase on the basis of market exchanges of want-based norms.
Concluding the section on low parent involvement, although SASA’s decentralized system of
educational governance was designed to promote local voice, we find that both township and the Bluff parents
rarely participate in democratic forums due to exit and want-regarding norms. One SGB member explained that
although there are 800 students at Durban Academy, roughly twenty parents show-up for parent meetings.
Teachers and SGB members agreed that the general attitude of parents is one of no involvement.
But complicating matters are teachers’ response to low parent involvement. Although the majority of
teachers preferred stronger parent involvement, a few teachers noted that low parent involvement made their day
to day work easier. Describing the advantages of an uninvolved parent community, one teacher stated, “The
nice thing for me is that the parents in general don’t really interfere what happens in the school. They come in
when they have a problem with the child, but generally they accept what you are doing [emphasis added].” As
in the autonomy concerns arising from low parent involvement in SGB affairs, a similar autonomy
compromising affect stems from low parent involvement with the teaching community. What is concerning
here is the teacher’s acknowledgment and even preference for low parent involvement. Again, despite the
decentralized system of education designed to give parents a voice, decisions are made for parents, not by them.

jobs, the discussion of want-based norms is used in the discussion of Bluff parents’ involvement since the other market
norms do not pertain to them.
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Egoism, Exit, and Parent Socialization—Concerns over Market Norms in Bluff Community
Beyond want-based explanations for low parent involvement, Bluff parents active in school affairs were
similarly governed by market norms. Egoism and exit were the most common methods of market practices in
parent approaches to education. Regarding egoism, one parent described her involvement narrowly in terms of
her child’s development: “I don’t do it for myself. I do it for my child’s education.” Though the parent
downplayed her personal egoism, valuing education solely for her child’s benefit reveals the egoistic tendencies
of the market. Corresponding with Ranson’s assessment of the individualism of the markets, one parent
remarked, “The motto I tell my child is: just remember, if you don’t do it for yourself nobody else is going to do
it for you.” The market’s promotion of competitive advantage fuels egoistic norms in parents’ approach to
education. Cooperation and fraternal relations are undermined by parents’ narrow concerns for their own
children.
As in the case of township parents, Bluff parents extended their egoistic understanding of education by
considering the practice of exit. During parents’ evening, one parent admitted to his intentions of pulling his son
out of Durban Academy and sending him to a private school or the Afrikaans school, Port Natal. Describing his
approach to education reform, he remarked, “I am not going to be a Bluff patriot.” The respondent explained
that he was not going to send his child to one of the public schools on the Bluff simply because he was a
resident there. He expressed a feeling of powerlessness and inability to affect change, arguing that he was only
one man and would be unable to improve the quality of the school. Again, the data identifies the way market
norms interplay with each other, forming more complex issues. Here egoism becomes entangled with parent
motivations of exit. Another parent accompanying a friend at parents’ evening admitted to sending her daughter
to Grosvenor Girls even though she lived across the street from Durban Academy.
As a final comment on Bluff parents’ exercise of market norms, Bluff parents’ practice of exit gives rise
to serious concerns over reconciliation efforts in post-apartheid South Africa. One of Anderson’s primary
concerns with markets in education is the relationship between the “freedom of parents” and the “autonomy of
children.” 81 While SASA and its stipulation of school fees increase parent choice, it reduces learners’
autonomy. Instead of education teaching learners to exercise their own judgment, schools become centers for
parents to indoctrinate their children with their own ideals. Since according to the student survey, students
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strongly agreed that their parents’ preference determines which school they attend, parents are able to determine
the types of values and knowledge they want their child exposed to through the practice of exit. One teacher
described the process of white flight from township schools in the suburbs by referencing parent preference for
schools with a particular ethos:
Now you bus these people in and the school now becomes a poor inner town school. So suddenly the
whole school’s ethos changes. The white parents of the kids in that school now, who can afford it, take
their kids out and they send them off to another school where there is an ethos that they want for their
children.
While a parent may opt out of a poorer school simply to provide a higher standard of education for their child, in
the post apartheid context especially, more extreme cases were related in which parent desires to indoctrinate
their children with particular values motivated decisions to exit.
Even though Pampallis observes that school fees have prevented a white flight from public schools, the
5% statistic of private school enrollees does not account for learner migration within the public school system. 82
The varying types and quality of schools within South Africa’s public education system allows for parents to
select schools that reflect their own value systems. In the case of Durban Academy, Bluff parents often
mentioned Port Natal, an Afrikaner school in Pinetown, as one of their ideal-options.
As noted in the section on Durban Academy, Port Natal was one of the schools that Durban Academy
considered amalgamating with during the 1997 transition period. While the quality of education and sport
remains strong at Port Natal, teachers and SGB members at Durban Academy expressed their concerns over the
types of knowledge that was being taught at the Afrikaans-only school. One SGB member explained his
concerns by describing the types of learners who matriculate from Port Natal:
But the kids that are coming out of that . . . where are they going to go? The environment they are
growing up in is not healthy. The kids’ minds get indoctrinated with one side of the story. In that way I
am so glad that the school went this direction. And like I said in the beginning when the people go out
to the workplace or to the university or into some real situation, he can concentrate what he really needs
to concentrate on and not these other issues.
Considering South Africa’s past, limitations on parent choice become a necessary step towards racial redress.
The market has complicated reconciliation efforts by normalizing parent exercise of exit. Anderson offers a
final assessment of the relationship between parents’ freedom and children’s autonomy by observing, “Parental
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rights to freedom of educational choice do not extend to holding their children in perpetual subjection to their
own ideals.” 83

Recap of Parent/Student Community
In the education market, children at a young age recognize the power of money in opening educational
opportunities. Differentiation by wealth subverts Anderson’s notion of fraternal relations as, “a valuation of
participants as equals engaged in a common cooperative project.” 84 When market norms enter the education
sphere, learners are separated by economic status, limiting the opportunities for learners to associate with peers
of different backgrounds. As a result, markets in education eliminate the ability for learners to experience and
realize the meaning of fraternal and democratic values.
The initial assessment of SGBs as need-regarding institutions is reversed by an examination of learner
exit. Since Anderson defines the want-regarding norm as, “desires backed by the ability to pay,” we see how the
SGB satisfies the wants of ‘better-off’ township learners. Motala’s (2007) observation on the internal
differentiation within poor township and rural communities clarifies this relationship: “Evidence is also
provided of internal differentiation within the poor, with ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ being apparent.” 85 The exiting
‘winners,’ are those learners whose ‘ability to pay’ allows them to attend former white schools in the suburbs.
Market values teach them the acceptability of “running away.” For township learners unable to afford exit, the
freedom to value education as a shared good is undermined by a strong desire to exit. From the perspective of
these ‘losers,’ one’s future success is understood as a matter of attaining enough money to exit and join the
winners in life beyond the townships and rural areas. Since, as Ranson suggests, the problems of our time
cannot be solved in isolation, how can we expect our future leaders to engage in collective problem solving and
address the needs of post-apartheid South Africa if they grow and mature in an environment governed by
individualistic market norms? An acceptance of the education market thus equates to an indirect acceptance of
the contemporary social ills present throughout South Africa.
For parents operating within the education market, the freedom to value education according to the
democratic ideals of the People’s Education movement is reduced to a competitive and egoistic approach in the
selection of schools. What was once a collective struggle for “Equal education for all,” has been transformed by
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market values into a society governed by individualistic competitive advantage. Parents prioritize educational
opportunities for their own child with little consideration of the well-being of other learners.

V. Conclusion
Recap of Market Norms in Durban Academy’s Valuations of Education
Market Norms

A. SGB
(Producers)

B. Teachers
(Facilitators)

C. Parents / Students
(Consumers)

1. Impersonal

Yes

No

-

2. Egoistic

Yes

No

Yes

3. Exclusive

No

-

-

4. Want-based

Yes

No

Yes

5. Exit > Voice

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

6. Is community
“comprehensively
governed” by market
norms?

Figure 5.1 corresponds with the research questions as noted in Figure 3.1.

School Governing Body:
A1: Blacklisting—old school funds and maintaining “the cycle.”
A2: The offer system—prioritizing schools funds over parent concerns.
A3: Inclusive admission policy, contrast with Glenwood, DHS.
A4: Differentiation among the poor, ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in virtue of students’ ability to pay.
A5: SGB platform for voice, but practical inaccessibility challenges for township parents.
Teachers:
B1: The desire for personal relations.
B2: Unwillingness to raise school fees and the coping mindset.
B4: Recognizing learners’ challenges and assuming multiple teacher roles.
B5: Opting to stay and to grapple with changes at Durban Academy
Parents / Students:
C2: Individual perspective and focus on their own child.
C4: Culture of want and the economic approach to education.
C5: Commuters exit township schools and non-commuters decline of Bluff patriotism.

______________________________________________________________________________
The introduction of school fees has created a market for public schooling whereby SGBs have become
local debt-collecting organs feared by the non-fee paying community. While reform efforts look to extend the
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number of non-fee paying schools to Quintile 3 schools, the education market would remain in place for
Quintile 4 and 5 schools. But as Motala observes, limiting a market for education to richer schools still impacts
the values richer and poorer students learn to endorse. In a partially regulated education market, exiting
‘winners’ still learn the acceptability of running away, while ‘losers’ compete for entrance into the winning,
richer sphere. Confining the market to Quintile 4 and 5 schools does little to address the ethical limitations of
South Africa’s education market.
This case study has examined the ways in which SGBs’ marketing responsibilities has undermined their
freedom to value education as a social good. The marketing norms within SGBs have compromised the freedom
and autonomy of parents and learners as well. Learners are unable to value their peers as equals, limited by the
market’s economic filtering of applicants through school fee based admissions. Students attend schools
reflective of their own economic status and mature in an environment that fails to demonstrate the values of
fraternal relations and cooperation. Parent autonomy is dominated by SGB decision-making in virtue of their
inability to attend SGB meetings and the want-based norms that govern their own valuations of education.
In conclusion, we recognize how the introduction of school fees has undermined the original goals of
the People’s Education movement. Recall Soobrayan’s assessment of the movement’s core values: “It must be
aimed at overcoming negative social values such as elitism, individualism, authoritarianism and
competitiveness—and in their place instill democratic values, collectivism, and a wider social consciousness.” 86
While the movement succeeded in establishing platforms for parent and student voice, the effectiveness of SGBs
has been undermined by the introduction of market systems. The “fear of victimization” from a central
authority is replaced by a “fear of debt collectors” at the local level. As a result of school fee policy, voice for
the majority of parents is exercised to such an insignificant extent that it differs little in comparison to their
expression of needs under the centrally controlled Bantu Education system.
Based on the case study of Durban Academy, the answer to Anderson’s final step is apparent: state
regulation of the education market is permitted. Anderson explains why the goals of education can only be
realized through non-market mechanisms:
Some goods can be secured only through a form of democratic provision that is nonexclusive, principleand need-regarding, and regulated primarily through voice. To attempt to provide these goods through
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market mechanisms is to undermine our capacity to value and realize ourselves as fraternal democratic
citizens. 87
Democracy, not markets, is best suited for parents and learners to realize themselves as democratic citizens.
Democratic provisioning of education secures collective community based deliberations and fraternal values that
were once a powerful force under the resistance to apartheid. The way forward thus requires a reassessment of
the past and reflecting on the original goals of People’s Education is a worthy place to start the restructuring
process.

Suggestions for Further Research
In any research project that lasts four weeks, one is likely to come across more questions than answers.
In addition to extending the market analysis of Durban Academy to case studies on more affluent and poorer
schools, the following topics are suggestions for further research.

The Relationship between Trade Unionization and Township Exit
During an interview with the SGB chairman, he remarked that many parents who send their children to
Durban Academy are teachers in township schools. When asked what explained this unique occurrence, the
chairman explained that teacher union strikes were the primary reason parents decided to send their children to
former Model C schools. The chairman’s observation is best communicated in his own words:
You find that a lot of those Umlazi and Lamontville’s parents are teachers. And it is amazing what they
tell you, I was dumfounded when they told me that. And it wasn’t just one person that told me that.
They said that they strike because they get forced to strike and at our schools we don’t strike. Because
they know that the children’s education will still carry on. And that was the biggest reason I found.
The chairman’s brief statement presents an interesting puzzle for a future ISP project. An examination of which
teacher unions are more likely to strike, for what reasons, and in which areas are these unions are strongest
would be a rewarding research project. A follow-up question might concern the relationship between teacher
unionization and parent decisions to exit. If teachers are more likely to exit, what inside information does
belonging to a teacher union provide that other parents might not know? A more positive research project might
look into the reasons why teachers decided to stay at township schools instead of joining their children in more
affluent schools in the suburbs.
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High Parent Involvement in Primary Schools?
Another suggestion for further research might look into what explains the high parent involvement in
primary schools. One SGB member described the poor participation of parents at Durban Academy by
comparing it to primary school SGBs: “When the children are in primary school, they [parents] go all out. If
primary schools have fundraising events, or fun runs, the parents are there. And it is as if the parents are burnt
out by the time their child gets to secondary school.” Supporting the SGB member’s observation, one teacher
remarked, “At parents evening we get a handful of parents, while at Primary school, I can promise you that they
will stand in line to get in.” Adding to the complexity of this question is the fact that Bluff primary schools
enroll a similar percentage of township learners. According to one respondent, 99% of commuting black
learners at Durban Academy attended English primary schools beyond the townships. If exit is already
occurring at the primary school level, what accounts for higher parent involvement at this stage? Another
research question might examine the effects of long distance commutes on young township learners’ academic
and social growth.
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Appendix A - General Interview Schedule
Community-specific questions were inserted at *points. See Figure 3.1 for more information. The
interview schedule was used initially, but became more of secondary support as I became more
comfortable with the interviewing process.
1. How long have you been _________ (a member of the SGB, teaching, a parent) at Durban
Academy?
2. What led to your decision in becoming X?
3. How would you describe Durban Academy to someone who has never been here before?
4. What do you think are the school’s strengths?
5. What do you see are the school’s major challenges?
6. *Want-Based: [by particular community]?
School Fees
7. How much are school fees at DA?
8. There is a lot of literature on the way class has replaced race in determining access to quality
public schools. Could you comment on this?
9. *Exclusive
10. What is your view of school fees (do you see them as necessary source of supplementary funds
or as a barrier to integration)?
11. I have heard many teachers describe Durban Academy as a school that is reflective of the
“rainbow nation.” What do you think of this description?
12. *Impersonal
Values
13. What would you consider the guiding values / principles at Durban Academy?
14. *Egoistic
15. Why do you believe parents and/or applicants choose Durban Academy as opposed to other
schools in the area?
Governance
16. What are your financial responsibilities?
17. Could you describe your relationship with the (SGB, teachers, parents)?
18. I had the chance to meet a former SGB president who mentioned that SGBs have a ‘de facto
ownership’ over the school. Would you consider this an accurate assessment of SGBs?
Durban Academy’s SGB?
19. *Exit > Voice:
20. What qualities do you hope Durban Academy instills in their learners before they matriculate?
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Appendix B – Student Survey
Please fill out the survey as completely as possible. Your participation is voluntary and answers should only be
provided to those questions you feel comfortable responding to. DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME ON THE SURVEY. The
survey is confidential and individual responses will not be shared with the faculty or staff at Durban Academy.
1.

Please indicate the area which you are from: __________________________________

2.

Please rank the following (from 1 to 7) in terms of what determined your decision to attend Durban
Academy (if an option does not apply please leave blank).
a. School history
________
b. Price of school fees
________
c. Quality of the school
________
d. Quality of the teachers ________
e. Distance from home
________
f. Athletics
________
g. Parents’ preference
________

3.

How would you characterize your participation in school affairs (e.g. attending sporting events, religious
services, volunteer meetings, etc.)?
a. Very active
b. Active
c. Occasionally active
d. Not active

4.

How would you characterize your parents’ involvement with Durban Academy?
a. Very active
b. Active
c. Occasionally active
d. Not active

5.

What is the best thing about Durban Academy?

__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
6.

What is the worst thing about Durban Academy?

__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
7.

If you were headmaster of Durban Academy what would you change? Why?

__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
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Appendix C – Revised Student Survey
Please fill out the survey as completely as possible. Your participation is voluntary and answers should only be provided to those
questions you feel comfortable responding to. DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME ON THE SURVEY. The survey is confidential and
individual responses will not be shared with the faculty or staff at Durban Academy.
1.

Please indicate the area which you are from: __________________________________

Please circle the answer that applies:
2.

My decision to come to Durban Academy was based on the languages offered.
a. Strongly Agree

3.

d. Disagree

d. Strongly Disagree

b. Agree

c. Neutral

d. Disagree

d. Strongly Disagree

b. Agree

c. Neutral

d. Disagree

d. Strongly Disagree

b. Agree

c. Neutral

d. Disagree

d. Strongly Disagree

b. Agree

c. Neutral

d. Disagree

d. Strongly Disagree

My decision to come to Durban Academy was based on the diverse student body.
a. Strongly Agree

9.

c. Neutral

My decision to come to Durban Academy was based on its distance from my home.
a. Strongly Agree

8.

b. Agree

My decision to come to Durban Academy was based on the quality of the teachers.
a. Strongly Agree

7.

d. Strongly Disagree

My decision to come to Durban Academy was based on quality of the school.
a. Strongly Agree

6.

d. Disagree

My decision to come to Durban Academy was based on my parents’ preference.
a. Strongly Agree

5.

c. Neutral

My decision to come to Durban Academy was based on the cost of school fees.
a. Strongly Agree

4.

b. Agree

b. Agree

c. Neutral

d. Disagree

d. Strongly Disagree

How would you characterize your participation with Durban Academy’s student activities?
a. Very active
b. Active
c. Occasionally active
d. Not active

10. How would you characterize your parents’ involvement with Durban Academy?
a. Very active
b. Active
c. Occasionally active
d. Not active
11. If you were headmaster of Durban Academy what would you change? Why?
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
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